Konflik Kepentingan Partai Politik dalam Pengadaan Barang dan Jasa Pemerintah

Political Party Conflict of Interest in Government Procurement

Abstract

This study examines the mechanisms of political party conflicts of interest in village procurement in Central Java, identifies regulatory gaps that enable such practices, and assesses their implications for good governance. The research employs normative legal methods using statutory, case, and conceptual approaches, complemented by interviews as supporting data. The findings indicate that village procurement is highly vulnerable to political intervention and patronage due to regulatory fragmentation among village procurement rules, administrative law, and political party regulations. A case study of village operational vehicle procurement reveals decision centralization, indications of collusion, and the instrumental use of procurement for political benefit distribution. These patterns demonstrate that party-related conflicts of interest are not incidental but operate systemically through power networks that undermine transparency, accountability, and administrative neutrality. The novelty of this study lies in its theoretical construction, positioning political party conflicts of interest in village procurement as a form of institutionalized structural corruption embedded in regulatory gaps. The study recommends clearer separation between political party functions and village governance, explicit conflict-of-interest regulation, strengthened oversight mechanisms, and integrity education for village officials.

Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis mekanisme benturan kepentingan partai politik dalam pengadaan barang/jasa desa di Jawa Tengah, mengidentifikasi celah regulasi yang memfasilitasinya, serta menilai implikasinya terhadap prinsip good governance. Penelitian menggunakan metode hukum normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan, kasus, dan konseptual, yang diperkaya dengan wawancara sebagai data pendukung. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pengadaan desa memiliki kerentanan tinggi terhadap intervensi politik dan patronase akibat ketidaksinkronan regulasi antara hukum pengadaan desa, administrasi pemerintahan, dan pengaturan partai politik. Studi kasus pengadaan kendaraan operasional kepala desa menunjukkan indikasi sentralisasi keputusan, kolusi, dan penggunaan pengadaan sebagai instrumen distribusi manfaat politik. Fenomena tersebut menunjukkan bahwa benturan kepentingan partai tidak bersifat insidental, melainkan beroperasi secara sistemik melalui jaringan kekuasaan yang melemahkan transparansi, akuntabilitas, dan netralitas pemerintahan desa. Kebaruan penelitian ini terletak pada konstruksi teoretis yang menempatkan benturan kepentingan partai politik dalam pengadaan desa sebagai bentuk korupsi struktural yang terinstitusionalisasi melalui celah regulasi. Penelitian merekomendasikan penegasan pemisahan fungsi partai dan pemerintahan desa, pengaturan konflik kepentingan secara eksplisit, penguatan pengawasan, serta pendidikan integritas aparatur desa.