Dinamika Blockholders dan Audit Fees pada Perusahaan Keluarga
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26623/slsi.v24i2.14016Abstract
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis bagaimana struktur kepemilikan blockholders memengaruhi penetapan audit fees pada perusahaan keluarga yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Perusahaan keluarga dipilih sebagai konteks penelitian karena karakter kepemilikan yang terkonsentrasi berpotensi menciptakan dinamika tata kelola yang kompleks serta meningkatkan risiko konflik kepentingan antara pemegang saham pengendali dan pemegang saham minoritas. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif dengan regresi data panel pada perusahaan keluarga sektor consumer cyclicals dan consumer non-cyclicals selama periode 2021–2024. Data diperoleh dari laporan tahunan dan laporan keuangan auditan yang dipublikasikan secara resmi. Audit fees diukur menggunakan logaritma natural biaya audit eksternal, sementara karakteristik blockholders direpresentasikan melalui keberadaan dan jumlah pemegang saham besar selain pemegang saham pengendali utama. Homogenitas kepemilikan keluarga diuji sebagai variabel moderasi untuk menangkap potensi dominasi pengendalian. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa keberadaan blockholders berasosiasi positif dengan audit fees, yang mengindikasikan bahwa auditor memandang kehadiran pemegang saham besar tambahan sebagai sumber peningkatan kompleksitas dan risiko tata kelola. Sebaliknya, jumlah blockholders tidak terbukti memengaruhi audit fees secara signifikan. Temuan lainnya menunjukkan bahwa homogenitas kepemilikan keluarga memperkuat hubungan antara keberadaan blockholders dan audit fees. Secara keseluruhan, hasil penelitian menegaskan bahwa pola dan karakter pengendalian kepemilikan lebih berperan dalam penilaian risiko audit dibandingkan sekadar jumlah pemegang saham besar.
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