

Visualization on Twitter Activism Networks and Opinion Leaders: The Case of #FreeWestPapua

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Abstract

Introduction: This study tries to visualize the Twitter activism networks and their opinion leader with the case of #FreeWestPapua activism. This study is important to find out who the opinion leaders and their networks are. This study also provides an overview of how the opinion leader frames opinions about #FreeWestPapua activism on Twitter.

Methods: This research used Social Media Network Analysis (SMNA). The SMNA method is the application of the Social Network Analysis (SNA) method to examine conversations on social media. Data collection and data processing are collected and visualised with Netlytic.

Findings: The results showed that there are 13 opinion leaders and all of the opinion leaders are from outside Papua. This study concluded that there is alienation in separatist activism in the case of #FreeWestPapua on Twitter. The most influential opinion leader in the separatist activism on Twitter is @VeronicaKoman who has the biggest values and is also active to frame public opinion. #FreeWestpapua activism framed Indonesia as a colonial in diagnostic framing and #FreeWestPapua as a solution in prognostic framing. To attract support from the international community, opinion leaders in #FreeWestPapua activism took advantage of the various #BlackLivesMatter issue and other international moments such as Korindo news by BBC.com.

Originality: Although a lot of research on the Free Papua Movement has been done, there has never been a study explains about who opinion leaders and their networks and also how they are framed public opinion about #FreeWestPapua activism on social media.

Keywords: Twitter Activism, Opinion Leader, #FreeWestPapua, Social Media Network Analysis, Alienation in Separatist Activism.

Introduction

There have been many studies discussing the Papua issue. One of the studies in Papua is the research conducted by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti and Natalius Pigay. The research entitled “*Finding the Roots of Problems and Solutions to the Papuan Conflict*” aims to find the roots of the conflict. The research was conducted using the grounded research method. The research concludes that the central government's policy on Papua is completely inconsistent and is one of the causes of the emergence of the Papuan independence movement (Bhakti & Pigay, 2016).

Other research reveals the cause of the birth of the Free Papua Organization. This research was conducted using the concepts of national integration and national independence. The study concluded that the birth of the Free Papua Organization was influenced by domestic and foreign conditional factors. government Domestic factors: Indonesia pays little attention to problems/disintegration that are grown from outside. While external factors, namely the existence of external interests control the natural

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resources of Irian Jaya/Papua (Ngatiyem, 2007).

Other research on the Papua issue proves the lack of communication between the central government and the leadership of the Papua province. Based on research using in-depth interviews with the chairman and members of the Papuan DPR and The MPR Papua for the 2009-2014 period concluded that based on the perspective of the Papuan legislators, the central government only understood the issue of autonomy from the perspective of the central government or in the language of the Papuan legislators, it was only based on the point of view of Jakarta (Ardiyanti & Sudjono, 2020).

Another study was conducted using a post-positivist deductive paradigm by collecting qualitative data through interviews, documentary studies, and focus group discussions. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in two stages, namely in Jayapura with the local government, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and community leaders. The purpose of this study is to analyze conflict management that has been carried out by the government in an integrative way within the Collaborative Governance framework. The research method used is the Post-Positive deductive paradigm by collecting data through interviews, focus group discussions, and surveys on the implementation of the Special Autonomy Policy. The results of the research based on the integrative framework of the Collaborative Governance model show that the collaborative process of implementing the Special Autonomy policy has not been successful and is less effective (Anriani et al., 2021).

This research reveals that one of the causes of the emergence of West Papua's desire for independence is that the Papuan population is displaced and their land is confiscated to make way for mining exploration and Javanese transmigration. Another research finding revealed is the number of victims from the local population from the mid-1960s to 1985, amounting to approximately 150,000 people who died since the operation to suppress the Free Papua movement (Gault-Williams, 1987).

Another study revealed the same thing using the ethnographic method. The migration of the Javanese to Papuan lands is thought to have caused West Papua to have become a sort of anthropological 'no man's land caught between very different ethnographic traditions (see Rutherford, 2010). Papuan hunting culture is relegated to the forest, on the other hand, Indonesians tend to be attracted--*slametan* and *gamelan*-- to the bright light of the Kraton tradition, which to some extent has been taken over by the state. Even myths about the sexual practices of cannibal women are widely circulated to promote the interests of the state, giving rise to a certain 'primitive' image. These 'lost tribes' reportedly live in remote areas of the province. However, on closer inspection, the state has designated these areas for development. These rumours gave reasons to take local land. Papuan culture which is framed as a 'primitive' culture is framed as a general medium for the expression of state power (Jolly, 1997). Representing the mythical West Papuan women like prostitutes with HIV/AIDS is the legitimacy of the state claiming legitimacy for its violence against women while trying to hide the violence on the grounds of development (Kirsch, 2002).

Another object study on the Papua issues is *Organisasi Papua Merdeka*/Free Papua Organization (OPM). OPM was founded by The Loedwik Mandatjan brothers on June 26, 1965. The main goal of the OPM was to liberate the country from foreign domination, as a history of their ongoing struggle. Then the OPM under the command of Ferry Awom carried out the first military rebellion that took place in Manokwari in 1965. The OPM was born as a response not only to the injustice of the socio-political system created by the colonial powers of Indonesia but also to the policy of denial adopted by the

international community in the 1960s (Otto Ondawame, 2000).

Studies with OPM objects include the study about the change in the naming of OPM from a separatist to a terrorist from a human rights perspective. This research is analytical with an explanatory approach that explains the reasons behind the policy taken by the Indonesian government to change the status of OPM to a terrorist organization. The findings of this study can be illustrated that the Indonesian government's policy to change the status of the OPM to a terrorist organization is motivated by several reasons, including OPM has fulfilled the definitive requirements as a terrorist; expanding the space for the Indonesian government to address OPM, including facilitating the tracking and blocking of funding for the OPM movement; Obtain legitimacy from any efforts or steps taken to deal with OPM; Using the “war on terror” norm to reduce the perception of human rights violations committed by the Indonesian government (Kusuma et al., 2021).

Another study seeks to find out how the existence of the OPM is in the 2019 vertical conflict. This study aims to explain how the conditions of vertical conflict between the Indonesian government and the OPM, the existence of the OPM in 2019 and how the International World View of Indonesia is about Indonesia's policies towards the OPM and Papua. The method used in this research is a literature study with heuristic steps, source criticism, and interpretation. The results of the study indicate that this Vertical Conflict occurs because of historical factors in the struggle of the nation, Politics, Social, and Indonesia's policy towards Papua. Starting from the case of racism against Papuan students in Surabaya, on August 16, 2019, finally, there were many riots in Papua. Several people were killed and injured in various areas, such as in Deiyai, Manokwari, Jayapura, Sorong, Timika, and Fakfak. Pro-Independence Papuans raise the Morning Star Flag which is the symbol of the OPM and demand independence from Indonesia (Nufus et al., 2020).

The rapid development of social media has influenced studies on the Free Papua Movement, including giving rise to studies on the use of Facebook for movement campaign media (Nurmandi et al., 2018). The Internet including Facebook and Twitter plays an important role in terms of early mobilization/warning and self-representation, in terms of organizing struggles, but also in sustaining action and maintaining relations between activists and their sympathizers (Cammaerts, 2007). The study was encouraged by studies related to the use of Twitter by the ISIS movement. The study on ISIS concluded that ISIS has an effective communication strategy by using social media as a medium to spread propaganda. Tweets on Twitter related to ISIS, including support for ISIS and its leaders (Al-Rawi & Groshek, 2018).

Although a lot of research on the Free Papua Movement has been done, there is no research on the opinion leaders and their networks and how they frame Free Papua Movement on social media. From previous research which discusses the internationalization of the independent Papuan movement by utilizing social media known there are many hashtags used such as #WeeBleedBlackandRed, #IamNesia, #IamNESIAnotINDONESIA, #INDOnotNESIA, #WP3MSG, #WestPapuaIsMelanesia, and #IStandUpMSG4ULMWP. The utilization of social media is not only used as a means to carry out campaigns proactively as a medium to provide information about the movement but is also used as a tool to socialize the movement and mobilize activists and be interested and participate in the movement (Titifanue et al., 2016). Then, #PapuanLivesMatter hashtags were first associated with the hashtag #Blacklivematter by Veronica Koman after the riots related to Papua in August 2019 (Tryasari, 2020).

However, among all these hashtags, the hashtag #FreeWestpapua is always used by the Social Movement Organization (SMO) @FreeWestPapua in campaigning for Papuan independence (Nasution & Wiranto, 2020). Therefore, this study used Social Media Networks Analysis (SMNA) to predict opinion leaders in #FreeWestPapua activism on Twitter and visualize their networks with Netlytic and also to analyse how opinion leaders influence the #FreeWestPapua activism on Twitter.

Twitter have both a direct and mediated effect on public opinion. Gaisbauer's study shows how opinion groups on the platform primarily shape public opinion on Twitter. Using the Saxon state elections and violent riots in the city of Leipzig in 2019 as a case and used networks as a mathematical abstraction to represent two types of interaction in the data set: retweets and replies, Gaisbauer, Pournaki, Banisch and Olbrich show that in both cases, two different opinion groups have an unequal impact on public opinion (Gaisbauer et al., 2021).

Another study discovered that public opinion on Twitter often evolves rapidly and levels off quickly into an ordered state in which one opinion remains dominant (Xiong & Liu, 2014). Through the hashtags on the actors and SMO of social movement framing the movement on Twitter so that it can build public opinion following the movement's goals. The actors and social media optimization related to social movement frame issues such that the public has the same opinions (Xu et al., 2014). Another study conducted by Simon Lindgren proved that Libyan activists used social media to share ideas and develop tactics, into becoming a true revolution (2013).

This research used the concept of opinion leaders, framing theory from Snow and Benford and the concept of 'connective action' to analyse the data. Opinion leaders are the most influential group in social systems (Nunes et al., 2018). In this study's context of social movements on Twitter or digital activism, opinion leaders are influential actors in each cluster in the networks. The main factor influencing public opinion is how framing can help people understand issues initiated by the movement. In social movements, the idea of framing focuses on the meaning associated with relevant events, activities, places, and actors (Moy & Bosch, 2013).

Framing theory is used to analyse in this study conducted by Snow and Benford. Framing identified three main task frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. Diagnosis framing addresses the problem of consensus mobilization by diagnosing some event or aspect of social life or responsibility. Prognostic framing primarily addresses the previously mentioned problem of action mobilization by stipulating specific remedies or solutions and the general means or tactics for achieving these objectives. Motivational framing entails the construction of vocabularies of motive (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Byrd, 2007).

This study uses the concept of 'connective action'. According to Bennett and Segerberg, there are three types of large-scale action networks exist self-organizing networks, organizationally enabled networks, and organizationally brokered networks. There is little or no coordination of actions in self-organizing networks, large-scale personal access to multilayered technology, communication content centred on an emerging and inclusive framework of personal action, and expression shared through social networks. There is loose organizational coordination of action and communication centres in organizationally enabled networks with the framework of inclusive person frames. Although organizationally brokered networks have strong coordination, SMO manages participation and has coalitions with different bridges through brokerage with high-resource organizations. Three main points characterize the connective action. *First,*

individuals do not need to commit to certain groups in political participation in cyberspace. Participation can be done without the hassle of being a member. the incentive is satisfaction when he expresses himself in the stream of social networks. In cyberspace, political activism is fluid, flexible, and non-binding because it is carried out personally, but is connected by a shared concern for certain issues. These actions are generally only united by anxiety and partiality to certain figures or issues, which are spread through social networks. Participation is spread by word of mouth, or viral from one media account to another, not through a centralized coordination channel. *Second*, political participation is more like individual personal expression than group action in digital media. The circulation of hashtags becomes a common frame as a marker of an issue, but the meaning can be different for each person. Through this frame, we can be connected, even though the narratives, views, and meanings given can be very personal, according to the aspirations, hopes, complaints, beliefs, and lifestyles of each. *Third*, communication networks become the core of organizations in the digital space, replacing the roles of leadership and membership hierarchies. Media is not only a channel but also provides a structure in the form of an algorithm to shape public perception and opinion (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).

Methods

This research uses Social Media Network Analysis (SMNA). According to Eriyanto, SMNA is a method used to map structures and actors in networks on social media. In principle, the SMNA method is essentially similar to SNA, only in SMNA, the network structure and the mapped actors are on social media (Eriyanto, 2021). The data in this research was collected from Twitter using Netlytic with the hashtags #FreeWestPapua, #WestPapua, and #PapuanLivesMatter from November 11, 2020, to January 19, 2021. Twitter was chosen as the object of study in this research because of the dominance of the use of Twitter as a channel to communicate ideas and ideas in the movement when compared to Facebook, for example, the nature of the Twitter platform which is more open to activism or social movements (Buente, & Robbin, 2008). Based on research conducted by Jen Schradie, movements made on Twitter have more varied levels of engagement based on social class than on other platforms (Schradie, 2018). In addition, the selection is also based on the thinking of Gerlitz and Rieder, Twitter has been considered a functional equivalent to the public square, while Facebook has been seen as a 'walled garden' or walled garden (Gerlitz, C., & Rieder, 2018). Another reason why choose Twitter is, that several movements that use Twitter have been proven to be able to take action on the streets. Like postings on Twitter with the hashtag #jan25, it became "*WAAKS of the Twitter world*" and exploded after the internet was blocked in Egypt (Gerbaudo, 2012).

Netlytic is is a cloud-based tool for collecting and analyzing data from social media (Gruzd et al., 2016). In 2006 Netlytic was used to analyze a large archive of bulletin board posts of online courses collected over several years (Haythornthwaite & Gruzd, 2008). Then Netlytic was developed to perform big data analysis as used to analyze Twitter Usage During the Euromaidan Revolution 2014 in Ukraine (Gruzd et al., 2017). Based on observations, the three hashtags are the most used in the #FreeWestpapua activism, there are #FreeWestPapua, #Westpapua and #PapuanLivesMatter. That's why this study use that three hashtags to collect the data. Data collect start on November 11, 2020, because on November 10, 2020, the song "*Tanah Papua*" was officially registered with

the Ministry of Law and Human Rights as a communal intellectual property belonging to the Government of West Papua Province (Republika.co.id, 2020). January 19, 2021, was selected become the last day of data collection because the consultation meeting between the DPR RI leaders and faction leaders on this day decided to form a special committee for the second amendment bill to Law No. 21 of 2001 about Special Autonomy for Papua Province (Merdeka.com, 2021).

By using Netlytic, research questions about opinion leaders, a network of opinion leaders and how opinion leaders frame a public opinion about the movement can be analyzed (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Gruzd et al., 2016). Netlytic was chosen to visualize opinion leaders and their networks and understand their discussion with the text analysis function in Netlytic. Opinion leader's networks in this study were visualised with the Fruchterman-Reingold model. This model is selected because it is an SMNA display that uses an algorithm database. Another reason why this study uses the Fruchterman-Reingold model is that model suitable for depicting networks with less than 1000 nodes (Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991). In this visualization, the node presented Twitter users even individuals or organizations. The connections between these nodes, also known as ties or edges, depict users' interactions such as replying, retweeting, or mentioning.

Results

To find out opinion leaders on the #FreeWestPapua activism and their networks, this study visualized the #FreeWestPapua activism networks on Twitter with the chain total degree networks using Netlytic. A chain network is formed when one account mentions another account (Who mentions Whom). The total degree network is the calculation of the in-degree network, which is the network that shows the account that is most often referred to as another account, and the out-degree network, which is the network that shows the most active account mentioning other accounts as follows:




Figure 1. #FreeWestPapua Activism Networks based on SMNA visualization (November 11, 2020–January 19, 2021) (source:

netlytic.org/network/sigma.php?c=QbnwbUJ7XnN9DPh7&viz=2&datatype=twitter)

Figure 1 known that the #FreeWestPapua activism networks have five big clusters, which are represented by one colour. The *first* cluster is formed with the @Amiryogi account as the centre or as an opinion leader. The *second* cluster is formed with the account @coolrunning2009, @nicolasnicola22, @vanesafiji, @katamoci, and @geomaticsfeed as opinion leaders. The *third* cluster is composed of ties with @TapolUK and @VeronicaKoman as opinion leaders. The *fourth* cluster is composed of

ties with @officeofJJR as an opinion leader. The *fifth* cluster is composed of ties to @freewestpapua as an opinion leader. Based on visualization data, there are 1367 ties created from conversations in the #FreeWestPapua activism campaign on Twitter:

Table 1. Network Properties

Analysis	Data
Poster with ties	173
Ties (include self-loops)	1367
Diameter	8
Density	0.008772
Reciprocity	0.005642
Centralization	0.102500
Modularity	0.458800

Note: This table shows network properties based on SMNA with Netlytic

Table 1 known that the network properties of #FreeWestPapua activism known that the diameter is 8. That is, the longest distance between two network participants is eight edges. The density in the #FreeWestPapua network is 0.008772. Therefore, the proportion of the existing ties to the total number of possible ties in a network is 0.008772. This measure helps illustrate how close participants are within a network. Reciprocity in the #FreeWestPapua network is 0.005642. Reciprocity shows two-way communication or reciprocal ties concerning the total number of the existing ties. Centralization in this network is 0.102500. The modularity of this network is 0.458800.

From the visualization of the #FreeWestPapua activism network known thirteen opinion leaders have different levels of influence. The level of influence of each opinion leader can be seen from the total degree value, in-degree value, and out-degree value. The in-degree value indicates the number of times the account was referred to by another account. The out-degree value indicates the number of times the account mentioned another account. The total degree is the sum of the out-and in-degree values. If the total degree number is higher, the opinion leader becomes the strongest influencer in the activism network as shown in Table 2:

Table 2. Opinion Leaders in #FreeWestPapua Activism (November 11, 2020–January 19, 2021)

No	User_id	Cluster	Location	User Category	Total Degree	In-Degree	Out-Degree
1.	@bennywenda	1	UK	Organization	30	26	4
2.	@amiryogi	1	Malaya	Personal	63	0	63
3.	@bellingcat	1	UK	Organization	32	32	0
4.	@BenDoBrown	1	UK	Personal	32	32	0
5.	@coolrunning2009	2	Australia	Organization	54	32	48
6.	@nicolasnicola22	2	Australia	Personal	56	6	55
7.	@vanesafigi	3	UK	Personal	62	1	56
8.	@katamoci	3	Norway	Personal	52	6	52
9.	@geomaticsfeed	3	Automatic	Organization	50	0	50
10.	@tapoluk	4	London	Organization	31	0	0
11.	@VeronicaKoman	4	Australia	Personal	46	46	0
12.	@officeofJJR	5	Ghana	Personal	46	46	0
13.	@freewestpapua	6		Organization	26	20	6

West
Papua

Note: This table describes Opinion Leaders in #FreeWestPapua Activism and their values based on SMNA with Netlytic

Table 2 shows that opinion leaders which have big in-degree values are: @VeronicaKoman and @officeofJJR with the same values which are 46 in-degree values. And then @bellingcat, @BendoBrown and @coolrunning2009 which have 32 in-degree values. Other opinion leaders which have big in-degree values are @bennywenda with 26 in-degree values and @FreeWestpapua with 20 in-degree values. Opinion leaders which have the highest out-degree values are @amiryogi with 63 out-degree @vanessafiji with 56 out-degree values and 6 in-degree values and @nicolasnicola with 55 out-degree values.

Another finding in this research is, opinion leaders in #FreeWestPapua activism can be separated into two: *first*, opinion leaders who are mentioned by other opinion leaders in Tweets campaigning for support for #FreeWestPapua activism. *Second*, opinion leaders actively mention other opinion leaders in their tweets (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Two Differences in Opinion Leaders Categories in #FreeWestPapua Activism based on SMNA with Netlytic (source: Primary Data, 2022)

From Figure 2, it can be seen: that @VeronicaKoman and @officeofjjr (46 times mentioned), the other accounts that have been mentioned the most in a row are @bellingcat (32 times mentioned), @bendobrown (32 times mentioned), @tapoluk (31 times mentioned), @bennywenda (25 times), @freewestpapua (20 times), @pangmedia (11 times), @youngsolwarap (11 times), @niewsch (11 times). However, although @VeronicaKoman and @officeofjjr have the same 46 in-degree values, @officeofjjr has mentioned 46 times because @BennyWenda sending deepest condolences to the people of Ghana following the passing of former President Jerry John Rawlings as follows:



Figure 3. @BennyWenda's Tweet mentioning that the President of Ghana (@OfficeofJJR)'s support for #FreeWestPapua (source: twitter.com/BennyWenda/status/1328313606451175426/photo/1)

Figure 3 shows that @BennyWenda's Tweet which is mentioned @OfficeofJJR and writes that "President Rawlings was a strong #FreeWestPapua supporter & told me "Keep fighting!"" has been retweeted 56 times. Meanwhile, @VeronicaKoman has mentioned by the @FreeWestPapua on November 17, 2020 tweet, as shown in the following image:



Figure 4. @VeronicaKoman has mentioned by the @FreeWestPapua on November 17, 2020 tweet (source: twitter.com/FreeWestPapua/status/1328394305975758849)

Figure 4 shows that the tweet by @FreeWestPapua mentioned @VeronicaKoman, and has been retweeted 41 times. The status of the @FreeWestPapua account wrote the status "Human rights organization @TapoUK in collaboration with @VeronicaKoman has published an extensive report on the 2019 #WestPapua Uprising, supplemented with a short video." The upload is accompanied by a report link and a video containing a summary of reports of events related to the riots that occurred in Papua. The report was written by the human rights organization @TapoUK in collaboration with @VeronicaKoman. The report is referred to as an extensive report containing the 2019 #WestPapua riots. The video included in the upload is a summary of the report uploaded on the website <https://www.tapol.org/>. The video opens with the impression that there is a crowd of people and a military apparatus is seen and a sound is heard shouting "Hey monkey, come out. Ape!" The video clip is accompanied by a written translation in English "Hey monkey, come out! Monkeys!" In the next crowd, a voice shouted, "Get rid of Papua. Jancuk! Get rid of Papua right now." Along with the shout, there was an inscription in English, "Kick out, kick out Papua, Bastards! Kick out Papua right now!" The broadcast continues with a crowd of Papuans and an orator shouting "Free Papua!"

Referendum! Yes!” The narration and video footage provide a frame for racism and the demand for a referendum.

In @VeronicaKoman's Tweet, she revealed the chronology of the riots that occurred in Papua. The trigger for the incident in Manokwari, West Papua on August 19, 2019, according to Veronika Koman, was a series of racist incidents against West Papuan students in several cities on the island of Java, namely: *first*, in Malang on August 15 2019. *Second*, a more significant incident occurred in Surabaya on August 16-17, 2019. Tensions were heightened when an incident occurred in Semarang on August 18, 2019. One of the factors that these incidents have in common is that the persecution contained threats to expel West Papuan students. What hurts the hearts of West Papuans the most is felt more deeply by the use of the racist word "monkey". A number of these events then triggered large-scale demonstrations in West Papua. The demonstrators carried posters containing among other things the statement that "Monkeys in West Papua can no longer live with humans in Indonesia" as well as demands for self-determination. Self-determination is seen as the solution to ending racism once and for all. The protesters against racism carried various posters that read "monkeys fight", wore monkey face masks, and were carried monkey posters at every protest.

According to Veronica Koman's Tweet, the incident in Fakfak on August 21 2019, the third day of the Rebellion was important. Because for the first time the Morning Star flag was hoisted in a public building. On that first day, the flag was hoisted on the flagpole of the Papuan Customary Council (DAP) in Fakfak. The flag was flown by the protesters, not by the DAP leader. The flag hoisting was witnessed by hundreds of people. Human rights activists are monitoring the event closely as they believe it will provoke a crackdown by the security forces. The military and police did not react to the raising of the flag, but a few hours later a militia group called the *Barisan Merah Putih*/Red and White Line (BMP) arrived and set fire to the office under the supervision of the security forces. Video footage shows Indonesian police and military directing militias to attack West Papuan protesters.

Based on data shown that @VeronicaKoman is active to frame a public opinion about #FreeWestPapua activism. The diagnostic framing from @VeronicaKoman centred on three issues. *First*, @VeronicaKoman frame for human rights violations by the Indonesian government. To encourage collective action, diagnostic frames often reveal events that are considered an 'injustice' over and over again. Diagnostic framing strategy by revealing events framed as an 'injustice' on tweet by @VeronicaKoman: "20-21/11/20 Puncak, West Papua A primary schoolboy, 3 high-school boys, and a man were shot by the Indonesian military and police in a fresh operation over two days. The dead bodies were found yesterday. A lone survivor tested that the shooters were Indonesian security forces."

In his upload, the account @VeronicaKoman wrote that on November 20-21, 2020, in Puncak, West Papua, there was a shooting of an elementary school child, 3 high school children, and a man carried out by the Indonesian military and police in an operation that has only lasted for two days. The body was found yesterday. The only survivors testified that the shooters were Indonesian security forces.



Figure 5. @VeronicaKoman Tweet which is blaming Indonesian Military and Police as a diagnostic frame

(source: twitter.com/VeronicaKoman/status/1331441785617358849)

As seen in Figure 5, @VeronicaKoman framing the Indonesian military as committing crimes against human rights using narration is also equipped with photos. The photos reinforce the framing done. With the narration and photos, the photos contain the meaning of a photo of the body of an elementary school-age child and photos of other corpses. Therefore @Veronicakoman become the most influencing opinion leader in #FreeWestPapua activism on Twitter. This is evidenced by the in-degree value of @VeronicaKoman which is the highest when compared to other opinion leader accounts. @VeronicaKoman is also more influential when compared to @Amiryogi. Even though @amiryogi has a value of 63 out-degrees or mentions 63 other accounts, the Tweets uploaded by @amiryogi are rarely retweeted by other accounts. This is evidenced by @amiryogi who only has out-degree values.

To answer the third question in this study, how opinion leaders framed public opinion about #FreeWestpapua activism, this study used the Neltytic text analysis. From the Netlytic Text Analysis from 1023 uploads, there are 10346 unique words found used to frame opinions in #FreeWestPapua activism as follows:



Figure 6. 100 Words Most Frequently Used on #FreeWestPapua (source: Netlytic Text Analysis)

Figure 6 shows that the hashtag #FreeWestPapua was most often used for framing public opinion 992 times. Meanwhile, the hashtag #WestPapua was used for framing 282 times. The hashtag #PapuanLivesMatter was used in framing 169 times. Other hashtags used in this movement are as follows: #solidarity 103 times, #occupying 90 times, #penghancuran 73 times, #selfdetermination 62 times, #papuajugamanusia 47 times, #savehutanpapua 26 times. Figure 6 also shows that @VeronicaKoman has mentioned 48 times, @bellingat 35 times, @bennywenda 29 times, @bendobrown 35 times,

@tapoUK 31 times, and @freewestpapua 38 times. From the words on the #FreeWestPapua network, it is known that several issues are used to shape public opinion, namely: papuanlivesmatter (169 times), colonial (108 times), solidarity (103 times), occupying (90 times), self-determination (62 times), Papuajugamanusia (47 times), human rights (39 times), global flag raising (37times), deforestation (28 times), climate justice (27 times), palm oil (24 times), international solidarity (24 times), and climate change (24 times).

The SMO of the #FreeWestPapua Movement on Twitter is @FreeWestPapua. From the text, analysis shows that there are 12 tweets by @freewestpapua from November 11, 2020, to January 19, 2021. The twelfth Tweet shows that the diagnostic framing from @FreeWestpapua is Indonesia's genocide and colonialism against West Papua. Prognostic framing is independence for West Papua and self-determination as a solution to the problems of West Papua genocide and colonization. Motivational framing in this movement is the international solidarity for supporting the Papuan independence.

By using diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing, @FreeWestPapua, as the SMO, forms an opinion on #FreeWestPapua activism. @FreeWestpapua as SMO consistently uses the same diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing to build public opinion regarding the movement. @FreeWestPapua as SMO also uses posters in the form of photos and videos to make diagnostic framing which is blamed Indonesia as an occupying country. One of the important visual components of social movements are photos, posters, and videos (Chadwick, 2007). Therefore, every upload of @FreeWestPapua always includes visualizations in the form of photos, videos, and posters (Figure 7).



Figure 7. Posters for Framing Public Opinion (source: twitter.com/FreeWestPapua/statuses/1327404684458545161)

Figure 7 shows a photo uploaded by @FreeWestPapua on August 23, 2019, which was found in the Kalitan area (Solo) and Jalan Ir Juanda, Jebres, Solo, Indonesia. It is suspected that the graffiti is the tail of the racist actions received by Papuan students in Surabaya and Malang. The action of crossing walls with the narrative "*Free Papua, Free West Papua*". The @FreeWestPapua post provides a diagnostic frame that Indonesia is the party to blame for the occupation of West Papua.

The frequency of the #FreeWestPapua activism campaign on Twitter fluctuates. The dynamics of the highest participation of Twitter users in the #FreeWestPapua campaign was observed on November 16, 2020:




Figure 8. The Counts of SMOs Participated in the #FreeWestPapua activism (source: based on SMNA with Netlytic Analysis)

Figure 8 shows that the highest number of uploads 198 was noted on November 16, 2020. The increased conversation was caused by the upload from @FreeWestPapua, which reminded us of 15 days remaining to the anniversary of West Papua’s independence on December 1. Another post that generated high participation in the conversation was about the Papuan independence movement on November 16, 2020, and was uploaded by @FreeWestPapua, who explained that @VeronicaKoman with @TapolUK had finished the report on the 2019 #WestPapua Uprising, supplemented with a short video. The post was retweeted 35 times, quoted 4 times, and liked 78 times.

Based on the results of the study, it is known that from 1023 uploads in the period 11 November 2020 to January 19, 2021, 968 posts have narratives supporting the #FreeWestPapua movement. Based on a search on Twitter, several accounts are belonging to global figures who voice support for the #FreeWestPapua activism. Among them is the account @EllyJonkerVliet, an Honorary Consul of the Republic of Vanuatu which has 3.232 followers. Another account @SamisoniPareti and wrote the location in Suva, Fiji, which has 5.039 followers.

Based on the primary data, known from 1023 posts about the #FreeWestPapua activism there are 55 tweets containing narratives contra to the #FreeWestPapua. But unfortunately, all of the accounts which is Tweet a contra to #FreeWestpapua have been suspended by Twitter because these accounts are bot accounts. Accounts suspended by Twitter are: @fernand42181103, @pluem13564373, @LysaBella28, @pikuuu1225, @BellaShi28, @EvanR28, @fernand42181103, @marianagrande33, @edycapcus, @parosehs, @NetepPhila, @AGUSTIN63134107. While the account that uploaded the narrative against #FreeWestPapua, there are still accounts that are not closed by Twitter. The accounts are @Joe12117228 (1,845 followers), @pertiwi86957822 (46 followers), @BersatuG (47 followers), @pangestu_resty (33 followers) and @IndonesiaLuv (1 follower).

Based on the data search, it is known that on November 16, 2020, there was the highest number of uploads, namely 198. Out of 198, there were 12 uploads containing contra against #FreeWestPapua. The 12 content against the #FreeWestPapua movement was uploaded by three accounts, namely @pikuuu1225, @Indonesialuv account and @Joe12117228 account. The 12 contents uploaded are mostly uniform. Account @Joe12117228 uploaded the same four content on the same day, namely: *"Let's share useful information in accordance with data and facts, we will fight hoax news. #WestPapua #FreeWestPapua #WP4MSG #RepublicOfWestPapua #NegaraRepublikWestPapua."*

Meanwhile, the @Indonesialuv account and the @pikuuu1225 account both upload the same content on the same day with a frequency of two uploads as follows: *"Repeatedly Disturbing Security, this is proof that the KKSB does not support development in Papua #FreeWestPapua #SavePapuaForest #PapuaIndonesia."* The same content was also uploaded by @Indonesialuv and the @pikuuu1225 account on the same day as one upload as follows: *"The KKSB Armed Criminal Separatist Group shot a local government vehicle that was transporting TNI logistics in the Kab. Bintan Mountains. This proves that the group does not at all support development in Papua. #FreeWestpapua #SavePapuaForest #PapuaIndonesia."* The next same content that was also uploaded by @Indonesialuv and the account @pikuuu1225 which was uploaded on the same day was uploaded one time as follows: *"The presence of the TNI-Polri in Papua is solely so that the community is safe from the terror of the Papuan armed criminal group (KKB) which creates unrest among the community and hinders development in Papua #FreeWestPapua #SavePapuaForest #PapuaIndonesia."*

Discussion

Of the thirteen Twitter accounts that become influential actors or opinion leaders, the majority stated in their bio that they are from outside Papua or Indonesia. Only @VeronicaKoman stated that she is in Indonesia and Australia, and @FreeWestPapua stated that their location is West Papua. But factually, all thirteen opinion leaders are outside Papua. These results prove that there is alienation in separatist activism in the case of #FreeWestPapua activism on Twitter.

The framing of #FreeWestPapua activism is the framing of the separatist movement. Because of that, the framing done is different from the framing done on another activism. Diagnostic framing on #FreeWestPapua activism blames Indonesia for being accused of carrying out attacks and occupations against Papua. In addition to attracting sympathy from environmental groups, the #FreeWestPapua activism also carried out diagnostic framing that blamed Indonesia for the destruction and deforestation of Papua's forests which were converted into oil palm plantations. The issue of deforestation, changing Papua's forests with the issue of #PapuanLivesMatter. #FreeWestPapua activism also forms public opinion to support the Papuan independence movement by campaigning on racial issues using the hashtag #pauajugamanusia. The prognostic framing in #FreeWestPapua activism is to encourage self-determination in the form of a referendum and direct the justification for Papuan independence. Meanwhile, the motivation that pushed the audience down was to provide support by using the hashtags #solidarity and #globalflagraising.

The network property of the #FreeWestPapua activism network is known that the participant is talking to many other users. From the density value, it can be concluded that in the #FreeWestPapua activism network the distance between nodes or actors is too far. From the reciprocity value close to 0, it is classified as low. From the value of centralization, we conclude that information flows more freely among multiple participants because networks with low centralization measures close to 0 are considered decentralized. Modularity indicates that in a cluster, the participants are decentralized and represent different groups.

Thus, it can be concluded, based on the network property, it is following the connective action concept from Bennett & Segerberg, (2012) that #FreeWestPapua activism does not have a clear organizational structure, and a member can easily join or leave an action. This is because social media has played a major role in providing new

public spaces for digital separatism, as was the case with Spain (Sampedro & Avidad, 2018). Thus, social media is now a tool for coordinating the masses in the digital space, replacing the roles of leadership and membership. The digital space is now also changing as a media that provides a structure in the form of an algorithm to shape perceptions and coordinate actions so that it can be said that the media is no longer a channel but has become a new public sphere. If the collective action requires that action must have an organizational structure to act, then connective action relies more on individual actions than collective action. That's why @VeronicaKoman is one of the opinion leaders in #FreeWestPapua activism.

Based on the Netlytic text analysis, the diagnostic framing of all issues was the same, which included placing West Papua as the victim party, while Indonesia was placed as the colonial. The prognostic framing used was also the same in each case, namely #FreeWestPapua. SMO and the Free Papua Movement actors also succeeded in conducting the motivational framing, namely the referendum in the Free Papua Movement on Twitter. Therefore, it can be concluded that the dynamics of more or less public opinion expressed on Twitter about the movement are influenced by the intensity of the SMO framing various issues related to #FreeWestPapua.

Various issues raised by #FreeWestPapua are aimed at recruiting new supporters of #FreeWestPapua activism. For example, in the period 11 November 2020 to January 19, 2021, issues related to the Korean palm oil company--Korindo were framed to get support from Koppers or the younger generation who like Kpop to support Papuan independence. This strategy is very effective in attracting the younger generation 'down the balcony' to provide support for the Papuan independence movement. Because social media greatly influences the younger generation in making decisions, as research conducted by Nur'afifah & Prihantoro, (2021).

To attract support from the international community #FreeWestPapua also took advantage of the various #BlackLivesMatter movements by campaigning for the special hashtag #PapuanLivesMatter. By using #PapuanLivesMatter, activists support #FreeWestPapua by framing the act of racism experienced by Papuans as justification for the demand for an independent Papua and counter-narrative on the issue of separatism. By proposing the issue of #PapuanLivesMatter, opinion leaders have succeeded in framing that the movement demanding Papuan independence is due to Indonesia's decades of actions, justifying its nationalist, exploitative, colonialist ambitions in Papua by expelling and treating Papuans as 'half animals'--black-skinned, white hair curly, stone age people who required assimilation or extermination (Webb-Gannon, 2022).

The motivational framing carried out by SMO #FreeWestPapua activism to mobilize the spirit of international solidarity to support Papuan independence is also a strategy that needs to be continuously improved. This is because social media is an effective tool to be used as a room for solidarity. A study on the use of Twitter as a space for solidarity during the Covid-19 pandemic revealed that although responding to issues in the same time frame and using similar narratives, solidarity actions raised by individuals, organizations, and communities were carried out personally and not directly tied to each other. However, not all solidarity actions get a high impression/engagement. Actors who become opinion leaders, who are influenced by in-degree, retweet and mention factors, have a big influence in carrying out solidarity actions (Kristianto et al., 2021).

By analyzing #FreeWest Papua activism on Twitter using the concept of connective

action from Bennett & Segerberg, (2012), this study concluded that, unlike other activism, separatism activism movement typology is an organizationally brokered network. This typology represents collective action with a hierarchical structure, centralized coordination of an organization, and a collective action framework to facilitate mobilization and participation. Organizations use technology to manage movement participation (recruit members) and coordinate goals (carry out publications). Organizational members remain the core actors in mobilization. They formulate a collective action frame to attract people to participate in the movement.

This study also concluded that grassroots organization is strengthened by personal expressions and actions carried out through Tweets accompanied by photos and videos as done by @VeronicaKoman as an opinion leader. Framing reinforced with photos can build public opinion and individuals who personally believe in the truth of the movement's goals. In addition, the tweets uploaded by @VeronicaKoman show individual personal expressions that attract various other personal actions. However, the logic of connective action is an addendum that complements (not replaces) the logic of collective action. Therefore, #FreeWestPapua activism still needs collective action to be able to realize the goals of their movement.

Although digital activism is not always successful and effective as a strategy for social movements, especially for separatism activism, by being mediated by technology, SMO movements can build shared awareness that forms the basis of collective movements. Activism thus, although there is no guarantee of success – especially with the repressive efforts of the legitimate government, at least activism fosters hope and strength to continue to guard and fight. Especially in the digital era, social media has become the main means of providing information. A study that analyzed the use of social media in seeking information about Papua revealed that the behaviour of using social media had a positive effect on respondents' concern about the issue of Papua, which was acceptable (Ashrianto & Yustitia, 2020). From the conclusion of the study, the role of opinion leaders to form a frame on various issues related to #FreeWestPapua activism on Twitter has been carried out by the SMO movement that supports Papuan independence is appropriate. This can be seen from the framing carried out by opinion leaders who fulfil two conditions related to the effectiveness of the movement's framing, namely: first, the movement is framed through a simplified narrative so that it is easy to digest and easy to spread. To keep it simple, in the narrative there must be a clear boundary between who is the 'victim' who is being bullied and who is the 'perpetrator' who is being oppressed. The second, namely iconization or the existence of symbols that become the face of a movement (Lim, 2013).

Therefore, this study suggests increasing the ability of Twitter Activism, activists who campaign #FreeWestPapua or those who campaign against #FreeWestPapua activism must be able to increase emotional contagion. As the study by (Grant & Smith, 2021), emotional contagion is one factor that determines the success of activism. In addition, with increasing emotional contagion, evidence shows that intergroup emotions have the same physiological, embodiment, and motivational characteristics as emotions experienced individually (Mackie & Smith, 2018) to reduce alienation towards Papuans themselves in #FreeWestPapua activism. On the other hand, activists campaigning against #FreeWestPapua must be able to present tangible evidence that the Papuan people can feel that what the #FreeWestPapua activist campaign for does not involve their emotions.

The goodness criteria in this study are to produce a proposition that can be tested for its generalizability. Credibility and trustworthiness in this study are that interpretations and conclusions are based on primary data sources obtained using Netlytic. Confirmability in this study is the result of this research if it is carried out by taking data at the same time the results will be the same even though it is done by anyone. The authenticity of data and research results are the results of authentic data collection. However, this study only explains how to build a public opinion through #FreeWestPapua activism on Twitter by using Netlytic. The explanation is described based on three things: how is the public opinion formed, how is framing carried out through the SMO movement, and the dynamics of public opinion on Twitter. The limitation of this research is data collection by using three hashtags. If there are movement actors and/or movement SMOs implementing a strategy of not using hashtags in conducting movement campaigns and they are not mentioned by another actor, the campaign they are carrying out cannot be mined.

Meanwhile, the weakness of this research is, like other online activism, the movement is done by pressing the like or retweet button, which Lim, (2013) calls slacktivism. Slacktivism is a form of activism that is considered lazy and ineffective to make changes. However, the large number of retweets of paid counter-vaccine opinions managed to amplify the narrative on social media, which eventually raised public awareness. However, the actions of parties in the offline realm are one of the factors that can make the movement unsuccessful. For example, the @Indonesialuv and @pikuuu1225 accounts have been suspended by Twitter. Therefore, in the future, if the Indonesian government wants to counter the campaign carried out by the Papuan independence movement, the counter-movement should be built on a real social movement model by utilizing social media including Twitter. Another important thing is that when carrying out counter-movements, the Indonesian government should avoid using robotic accounts. Another weakness of this study is the object study #FreeWestPapua activism on Twitter which is based on the Application Programming Interface (API). The API compiles what data is extracted, for example, on Twitter capturing only certain hashtags associated with an event rather than all relevant tweets. Consequently, there is no guarantee that two research teams that attempt to collect the same data at the same time will end up with identical data sets (Bruns & Stieglitz, 2013).

Conclusion

SMNA can be used to visualize the opinion leaders' networks on #FreeWestPapua activism. This study found that there is a network of opinion leaders in #FreeWestPapua activism consisting of 13 opinion leaders with the most influential opinion leader @VeronicaKoman. This study also concludes that the opinion leaders of #FreeWestPapua activism are international actors outside Indonesia. This shows that efforts to internationalize the Papua issue must be taken seriously by the Indonesian government by building a counter-movement using a real social movement model that is run organically with an international actor as an opinion leader and avoiding the use of robotic accounts. For further study, we can use frame alignment theory to analyse the process of aligning the frame between SMO and the audience. This study needs to be carried out to find out the right counter-narrative and how the narrative used can be in harmony with the frame of the Papuan people. Because as stated by Snow et al., (1986), frame alignment is one of the most influencing factors for the success or failure of a movement. So, the

next research can be examining the alignment between the framing @FreeWestPapua as SMO and another opinion leader's framing of #FreeWestPapua activism.

Conflict of Interest

We certify that there is no conflict of interest with any financial, personal, or other relationships with other people or organizations related to the material discussed in the manuscript.

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